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KAHLER V. KANSAS: THE END OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE?
ERIC ROYTMAN*
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, American and English courts refused to assign
criminal liability to defendants who, because of mental illness, did not
understand the wrongfulness of their actions. Hundreds of years before
the Framers were born, English courts widely recognized a mentally ill
defendant’s right to avoid criminal liability when he lacked moral
understanding. From the American Revolution to the turn of the
twenty-first century, courts in every jurisdiction in America widely
recognized this right as well.
In 1995, Kansas, along with a small number of other states, passed a
statute abrogating the widely recognized common law insanity defense.
At common law, a defendant could raise the defense when a mental
illness impaired his ability to distinguish right from wrong, allowing him
to escape liability even when the elements of the crime were otherwise
fulfilled. However, under Kansas’ statutory scheme, evidence of a
defendant’s mental illness can only be used to negate the mens rea
element of the offense. In other words, evidence of mental illness is only
relevant when it shows that the defendant lacked the intent to commit
the act itself, regardless of whether he believed that act was moral. In
Kansas, a defendant driven by mental illness to intentionally harm
another has no viable path to acquittal at trial, even when his mental
illness caused him to believe his actions were morally right.
In Kahler v. Kansas,1 the Supreme Court will consider the
constitutionality of Kansas’s statutory scheme. The Court’s decision in
this case will have profound implications for how courts deal with
defendants struggling with mental illness. A decision to uphold
Kansas’s statute could be interpreted as a green light for other states to
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abolish a right that was firmly entrenched in common law long before
the Court even existed.
This Commentary will analyze Kansas’s statute in light of the
Petitioner’s Due Process and Eighth Amendment challenges. Doing so
requires examining the origins of the insanity defense and the
importance of moral capacity in the American criminal justice system.
This Commentary will argue that (1) Kansas’s statute is
unconstitutional because the Due Process Clause proscribes state
governments from assigning criminal liability to defendants who
cannot differentiate right from wrong; and (2) the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the statute at issue in this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Insanity Defense Law in Kansas
From 1881 to 1995, defendants in Kansas were able to raise an
affirmative insanity defense.2 This defense excused a defendant from
criminal liability “(1) where he does not know the nature and quality
of his act, or, in the alternative, (2) where he does not know right from
wrong with respect to that act.”3 If a defendant could affirmatively
prove either prong of the test, he was excused from liability, whether or
not the prosecution otherwise proved the elements of the offense.4
Kansas’s rule was the norm—the affirmative insanity defense was
available in some form to defendants in every state until 1979.5
However, in 1995, the Kansas legislature passed a law to restrict
defendants’ access to the common law insanity defense.6 After a string
of high-profile cases where defendants were found not guilty by reason
of insanity, the Kansas legislature sought to make it more difficult for
defendants to utilize the insanity defense. The legislature decreed that
mental illness could only be used at trial to show that the defendant
“lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged.”7

2. Brief for Petitioner at *2, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (May 31, 2019) [hereinafter
Brief for Petitioner].
3. State v. Baker, 819 P.2d 1173, 1187 (Kan. 1991).
4. See id.
5. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *2.
6. Id. at *5.
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2010).
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Under Kansas’s new mens rea scheme, a defendant’s ability to
distinguish right from wrong has no bearing on his guilt or innocence.8
Moreover, the defendant can no longer use evidence of mental illness
affirmatively. After the law passed, the Kansas Supreme Court
recognized that the legislature had abolished the insanity defense.9
B. Facts
Petitioner, James Kahler, has long suffered from obsessivecompulsive personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and
narcissistic personality disorder.10 Throughout his adult life, he was
obsessed with what others thought of him and his family.11 His mental
illness manifested in exercising meticulous control over his family
affairs and micro-managing the lives of his wife, Karen, as well as his
children.12
In 2008, James Kahler’s life changed drastically.13 The Kahler family
moved from Texas to Missouri.14 Karen had an extramarital affair with
her personal trainer and soon filed for divorce.15 As Mr. Kahler’s
carefully controlled routine fell apart, his mental state also
deteriorated.16 He was obsessively suspicious that Karen was trying to
humiliate him.17 He tracked Karen’s phone calls, text messages, and
social media interactions.18 He stalked his wife and kids.19 His
obsessions overtook his work life, and he lost his job in 2009.20 Without
work, he moved back in with his parents at their ranch.21 Kahler
increasingly focused all of his rage on his wife and daughters, believing
they were the sole cause of his failure.22

8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *5.
9. State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (Kan. 2003); see also State v. Jorrick, 4 P.3d 610, 617
(Kan. 2000) (“Kansas is among a minority of states that have done away with the insanity and
diminished capacity defenses.”).
10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *6–7.
11. Id. at *7.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *7–8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *9.
22. Id.
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Mr. Kahler’s devolving mental state reached a critical point during
Thanksgiving of 2009.23 On Friday, November 27, Kahler’s son came to
stay with Kahler and his paternal grandparents at the ranch.24 Mr.
Kahler and Karen had planned for their son to have Thanksgiving
dinner at his maternal grandmother’s house with his mother and sisters
the next day.25 However, on Saturday morning, Kahler’s son called
Karen and asked if he could remain with his father for an additional
day.26 Karen refused.27 While Mr. Kahler was out cashing a paycheck,
his son returned to his maternal grandmother’s house to celebrate
Thanksgiving with his mother and sisters.28
When Mr. Kahler arrived home to find his son gone, he
“snapped.”29 He drove to his ex-mother-in-law’s house with several
loaded rifles.30 He entered the home in a fit of rage, shouting expletives,
and shot his wife, her mother, and his daughters.31 Kahler’s son ran out
the back door unharmed.32 Police found Mr. Kahler walking down a
country road the next day, and he submitted to arrest without protest.33
C. Proceedings Below
Before Mr. Kahler’s capital murder trial, he requested jury
instructions that would mandate acquittal if he proved that, because of
his mental illness, he did not understand that his actions were wrong.34
The trial court denied the request, finding that the instructions were
prohibited by the governing statute.35 At trial, the judge instructed the
jury that Mr. Kahler’s mental illness was only relevant if it affected his
intent to kill.36 The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.37

23. Id. at *9–10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Mr. Kahler’s actions are undeniably heinous. However, this Commentary focuses on
the facts of Mr. Kahler’s mental illness and the Due Process that should be afforded to all
defendants suffering from mental illnesses.
34. Id. at *11.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Kahler appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.38 He argued that
his conviction violated the Due Process Clause and that his death
sentence was proscribed by the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.39 The court rejected both arguments, affirming his
conviction and sentence.40 Mr. Kahler filed a petition for writ of
certiorari on September 28, 2018.41 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on March 18, 2019.42
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is a common law fixture older than the United
States itself. As early as the fourteenth century, English courts regularly
applied the “good and evil” test, which excused a defendant from
criminal liability when his mental illness prevented him from
understanding that his actions were immoral.43 In 1843, the English
Lords of Justice addressed the issue of legal insanity in M’Naghten’s
Case.44 The justices incorporated hundreds of years of Anglo-American
common law, articulating a seminal rule:
To establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly
proved, that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.45

At the time of the American Revolution, English courts frequently
excused defendants who, as a result of mental illness, did not

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *11–12.
41. Id. at *1.
42. 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
43. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 928 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (“During
the reign of Edward II (1307-1321), there was a shift toward recognizing insanity as a complete
defense, which was perfected by the time of the ascension of Edward III to the throne (13261327).”); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84 (Nev. 2001) (“Legal insanity has been an established
concept in English common law for centuries.”). See also Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond,
The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent
Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (1966)
(“During the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries . . . the ‘good and evil’ test was
regularly cited by judges and legal commentators.”).
44. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718.
45. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
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understand that their actions were wrong.46 Early American courts
adopted the English insanity defense, integrating the principle that
criminal liability required that a defendant had “sufficient memory,
intelligence, reason and will, to enable him to distinguish between right
and wrong . . . .”47
On several occasions, the Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental nature of an insanity defense that excuses those who, as a
result of mental illness, do not appreciate the moral nature of their
actions. In Morissette v. United States, the Court observed that the
requirement that criminal defendants possess an “evil-meaning mind
. . . took deep and early root in American soil.”48 In Penry v. Lynaugh,
the Court held that “it was well settled at common law that [mentally
ill defendants] were not subject to punishment for criminal acts
committed under those incapacities.”49
As American jurisprudence evolved, the common law yielded
several different variations of the insanity defense. These included
cognitive incapacity, where the defendant cannot appreciate the nature
of his actions; volitional incapacity, where the defendant cannot control
his actions; and the product-of-mental-illness test, where the
defendant’s actions were the product of mental disease or defect.50
Underlying all of these variations was the unifying concept espoused in
the original “good and evil” test: a defendant cannot be criminally
liable when, as a result of mental defect, he does not understand his
actions were wrong.
While the Court has allowed states the freedom to implement and
experiment with a variety of insanity defense rules,51 it has never
expressly permitted a state to ignore the impact of a defendant’s mental
illness on his understanding of the wrongfulness of his behavior. In
46. See Platt & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1236 (“In the eighteenth century, the ‘good and
evil’ test was regularly used in both insanity and infancy cases.”).
47. See Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 326 (1847); see also State v. Spencer, 1846 WL 3316 at
*202 (N.J. O. & T. 1846) (considering whether the defendant is “capable of moral action and of
discerning between right and wrong”), People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1845) (“The inquiry to be made under the rule of law as now established, was as to the prisoner’s
knowledge of right and wrong at the time of committing the offense.”), Commonwealth v. Rogers,
48 Mass. 500, 501–02 (1844) (holding that when a defendant cannot “distinguish between right
and wrong . . . he is not responsible for such act”), State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 48 (1841) (holding
that the insanity defense requires that a defendant is “incapable of judging between right and
wrong”).
48. 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952).
49. 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
50. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006).
51. See id. at 752 (“[T]he insanity rule . . . is substantially open to state choice.”).
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Clark v. Arizona, the state passed a statute prohibiting defendants from
arguing that their mental illness caused cognitive incapacity.52 The
Court found that Arizona’s scheme was “constitutionally adequate[,]”
in part because the state still allowed defendants to argue that they did
not know that their actions were wrong.53 The Court noted that it has
long been understood that the cognitive incapacity defense is merely a
subcategory of the larger moral incapacity rule.54
B. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”55 The Court
generally defers to the states in matters of criminal law.56 However, a
state criminal law still violates the Due Process Clause when it “offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”57 The Court looks to “the
teachings of history” and a “solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society” when determining whether legal principles are
fundamental and deeply rooted.58
C. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual
punishments.”59 In determining which punishments qualify as cruel and
unusual, the Court has applied two different forms of analyses: (1)
founding-era analysis60 and (2) proportionality analysis.61
52. Id. at 748.
53. See id. at 753 (Noting that “cognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral
incapacity” because, “if a defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could not
have known that he was performing . . . [a] wrongful act.”).
54. See id. at 754 (Noting the “long-accepted understanding that the cognitively
incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated.”).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
56. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
57. Id. at 201–02 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
58. Moore v. Cty. of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1972) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring)).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
60. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment bans “modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted”).
61. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (holding that the punishment for
crime should be “graduated and proportioned to the offense”) (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
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Under the founding-era analysis, the Eighth Amendment bans
“those practices condemned by the common law in 1789.”62 Thus,
punishments that “a reader at the time of the Eighth Amendment’s
adoption” would have considered cruel and unusual are proscribed.63
Proportionality analysis is based on the “precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.”64 To determine whether a particular punishment is
proportional to the offense, the Court examines “objective indicia of
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice.”65 The Court also exercises its independent judgment,
considering factors such as the Court’s prior precedents,66 the
offender’s culpability, and penological goals served by the challenged
sentence.67
III. HOLDING
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Kahler’s conviction and
sentence, citing its prior holding in State v. Bethel.68 In Bethel, the
Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the affirmative insanity defense
was “not so ingrained in [Kansas’s] legal system” as to be considered
fundamental, and that Kansas’s mens rea approach survived Eighth
Amendment scrutiny because it “does not expressly or effectively
make mental disease a criminal offense.”69
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner makes two core assertions: (1) Kansas’s statute violates
the Due Process Clause by eliminating the insanity defense, and (2)
Kansas’s statutory scheme constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.70

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(2002)).

Ford, 477 U.S at 399.
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 67.
State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 378 (Kan. 2018).
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851–52 (2003).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *12 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306
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First, Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause requires a legal
path of excuse for defendants who, by nature of their mental illness,
lack moral culpability.71 Petitioner supports this claim through a
historical analysis of the insanity defense in ancient cultures, the
English common law, and the American legal tradition.72 Petitioner
points out that several religious holy books and ancient Greek
philosophers all discuss the need to excuse those who lack moral
capacity.73 Further, academic legal giants in English common law—such
as Coke and Blackstone—argued that criminal liability required moral
understanding.74 Turning to American common law, Petitioner points
out that most jurisdictions in America have maintained some sort of
insanity defense since the Founding and that forty-five out of fifty
states still provide an affirmative insanity defense today.75 After
establishing these fundamental standards, Petitioner argues that
Kansas’s statutory scheme violates the Due Process Clause by
eliminating the insanity defense and assigning liability to people
without moral culpability.76
Second, Petitioner argues that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment prohibits criminal punishment of people
who, by reason of insanity, lack moral culpability.77 Citing the
widespread acceptance of the insanity defense in American common
law since the Founding,78 Petitioner argues that criminal punishment of
the insane was “condemned by the common law in 1789” and that “a
reader at the time of the Eight Amendment’s adoption” would have
deemed criminal punishment of the insane to be cruel and unusual.79
Petitioner also argues that criminal punishment of the insane is grossly
disproportionate because it serves no penological purpose.80 Finally,
71. See id. (“The Constitution requires states to provide some mechanism to excuse criminal
defendants whose mental states render them blameless.”).
72. See id. at *18–29.
73. See id. at *18–20 (“Ancient civilizations recognized the distinction between the insane
and those capable of understanding the moral implications of their actions. In the early Jewish
tradition, ‘madness’ was an excuse for otherwise punishable crimes.”).
74. See id. at *21–22 (“Lunatics or infants . . . are incapable of committing any crime; unless
in such cases where they show a consciousness of doing wrong.”).
75. See id. at *14, *28 (citing State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 996 (Mont. 1984)).
76. See id. at *39 (“Kansas’s ‘mens rea approach’ violates the Constitution.”).
77. See id. at *29. ([T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from punishing a criminal
defendant without regard to his ability—as a result of mental illness—to rationally appreciate that
his actions are wrong.”).
78. See id. (citing numerous cases).
79. See id. (citing Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019) and Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
80. Id. at *14.
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Petitioner argues that assigning any criminal liability whatsoever to
people who cannot tell the difference between right and wrong is cruel
and unusual punishment in itself.81
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues that (1) Kansas’s mens rea approach does not
violate the Due Process Clause, and (2) Kansas’s statutory scheme does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.82
First, Respondent argues that no particular insanity test is deeply
rooted in the American legal tradition, as the Court noted in Clark.83
Respondent points out that many different tests for insanity have been
used at common law, including Kansas’s mens rea approach.84 When a
principle is not “deeply rooted” in the American legal tradition, the
Court typically interprets the Due Process Clause deferentially to avoid
interfering with individual states’ administration of justice.85
Respondent believes the Court should apply this deferential approach
here.86
Respondent then argues that consideration of a defendant’s ability
to distinguish right from wrong is not deeply rooted in the American
legal tradition.87 Pointing to criminal punishments of religious terrorists
and murderers of abortion doctors, Respondent asserts that society can
reasonably find individuals blameworthy regardless of whether they
understand the wrongness of their actions.88 Thus, states are free to
punish those who do not understand that their actions are wrong.89

81. See id. at *29 (“Whether viewed through the Founding-era lens or the modern
proportionality lens, the Eight Amendment prohibits a State from punishing a criminal defendant
without regard to his ability—as a result of mental illness—to rationally appreciate that his actions
are wrong.”).
82. Brief for Respondent at *14, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (Aug. 2, 2019) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent].
83. See id. at *15 (“As this Court has previously recognized, the Due Process Clause does
not mandate that States adopt any one particular approach to insanity.”).
84. See id. at *32 (“Historically, a variety of tests . . . have been used to define insanity.”).
85. See id. at *39 (“States have the freedom to determine whether, and to what extent,
mental illness should excuse criminal behavior.”).
86. Id.
87. See id. at *16 (“It is a longstanding principle that knowledge of the law is not required
for criminal culpability.”).
88. Id. at *40–41.
89. See id. at *40 (“The fact that someone does not understand that what they are doing is
morally wrong does not render them blameless.”).
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Second, Respondent argues that Kansas’s statutory scheme does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.90 The Eighth Amendment applies
to modes of punishment, not modes of liability.91 Since Kansas’s mens
rea approach addresses only liability and not punishment, the Eighth
Amendment has no bearing on it.92
Respondent then argues that even if the Eighth Amendment did
apply to the statute at issue, Kansas’s statute does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.93 Respondent supports this claim by arguing
that the mens rea requirement and the insanity defense have been
historically intertwined.94 Thus, Kansas’s approach would have been
acceptable to readers at the time of the Eighth Amendment’s
adoption.95 Respondent also argues that the mens rea approach does
serve penological purposes.96
Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment
claim is not properly before the Court because Petitioner did not make
an identical argument before the Kansas Supreme Court.97 Petitioner
disputed his sentence—rather than his liability—on Eighth
Amendment grounds in the Kansas Supreme Court.98 Pointing out that
the Court has previously refused to consider issues that were not raised
below, Respondent argues that the Court should refuse to consider
Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim on either jurisdictional or
prudential grounds.99

90. Id. at *45.
91. See id. at *47 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment only applies to bar certain punishments; it
does not constrain the substance of state criminal liability, including what affirmative defenses
States must make available.”).
92. See id.
93. Id. at *49.
94. See id. (“[I]nsanity was historically equated with a lack of mens rea.”).
95. See id. (“[T]he mens rea approach to insanity would not have been considered cruel and
unusual at the time of the Founding.”).
96. See id. at *50. (“Nor is the mens rea approach inconsistent with any of the criminal law
purposes that Kahler identifies . . .”).
97. See id. at *45 (“In his briefs before the Kansas Supreme Court, Kahler did not argue that
Kansas’s mens rea approach to insanity violates the Eighth Amendment. As a result, the Kansas
Supreme Court did not address this issue. Thus, Kahler’s Eighth Amendment claim is not
properly before this Court.”).
98. Id. at *46.
99. See id. At *47 (“Because this Court is a court of review, not of first view, it should refuse
to consider this issue, regardless of whether the rule is jurisdictional or prudential.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Respondent’s mens rea scheme violates the Due Process Clause.
The Due Process Clause protects principles of justice that are so
deeply rooted in the American legal conscience as to be considered
fundamental.100 Kansas’s scheme violates the deeply rooted principle
that criminal liability cannot be assigned to a defendant who, as a result
of mental illness, lacks the capacity to understand that his actions were
wrong.101 This underlying principle is the foundation upon which all
subsequent variations of the insanity defense rest. As the Court
recognized in Clark, cognitive incapacity is merely a “subset” of the
original “right from wrong” test.102 In this way, the ability to
differentiate right from wrong is the due process foundation that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects. States are free to build on that
foundation by implementing whatever additional versions of the
insanity defense they prefer. But the Due Process Clause forbids states
from removing that foundation entirely.
Respondent’s so-called “mens rea approach” to insanity does not
account for the defendant’s moral capacity at all. As applied in criminal
law today, mens rea focuses on the defendant’s specific intent to commit
particular actions that the state considers to be criminal, ignoring
whether the defendant judges those actions to be wrong.103 Thus, in
Kansas, a defendant may be guilty of murder if he knowingly or
intentionally kills someone, regardless of whether he believed his
killing to be morally justified. This distinction demonstrates that mens
rea and moral capacity are fundamentally different concepts. Mens rea
involves the defendant’s intent to commit an action.104 Conversely,
moral capacity involves the defendant’s ability to evaluate whether that
100. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977).
101. See State v. Spencer, 1846 WL 3316 (N.J. O. & T. 1846) (considering whether the
defendant is “capable of moral action and of discerning between right and wrong”); People v.
Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“The inquiry to be made under the rule of
law as now established, was as to the prisoner’s knowledge of right and wrong at the time of
committing the offense.”); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 500, 501–02 (1844) (holding that
when a defendant cannot “distinguish between right and wrong . . . he is not responsible for such
act”); State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 48 (1841) (holding that the insanity defense requires that a
defendant is “incapable of judging between right and wrong”).
102. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 754 (2006) (Noting the “long-accepted understanding
that the cognitively incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated.”).
103. See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 337 (1989) (“[M]ens rea
terminology has come to refer to the specific state of mind required for the conviction of particular
criminal offenses.”).
104. Id.
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action was right or wrong. For hundreds of years, American
jurisdictions have contemplated both factors when assigning criminal
liability. Kansas only contemplates one.
Respondent argues that the mens rea approach is merely an
alternative insanity defense, rather than an outright abolition.105 This
argument misses the mark for three reasons. First, the deeply rooted
principle at the base of the insanity defense is the necessity of excusing
people who cannot differentiate right from wrong.106 Thus, a statutory
scheme that contradicts this baseline principle is not an insanity
defense of any kind. Second, the Kansas legislature quite literally
passed the statute in question for the purpose of eliminating the
insanity defense.107 Third, the Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly
identified this statutory scheme for what it is—an abolition of the
insanity defense.108
Consider the example of a man who killed his friend because, as a
result of schizophrenia, he believed that his friend would soon commit
a deadly terrorist act. This man undoubtedly has the requisite mens rea
for murder—the killing was intentional. However, a mental illness
caused the man to believe that his intentional actions were morally just.
In nearly all jurisdictions throughout Anglo-American common law
history, this individual would have had the chance to avoid criminal
liability by proving that mental illness prevented him from grasping the
wrongfulness of his actions. Not so in Kansas. Instead, Respondent’s
scheme renders evidence of moral incapacity resulting from mental
illness irrelevant, and thus inadmissible. Indeed, Mr. Kahler originally
asked the trial court to allow him to argue that his delusions about his
family prevented him from fully understanding the wrongfulness of his
actions. The trial court denied the request because it found that
Kansas’s statute rendered such arguments irrelevant. Mr. Kahler had
the requisite mens rea by intending to kill his victims, which his mental
illness did not negate, so his illness played no further part. In short, this

105. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *9 (“While Kansas no longer has an
affirmative defense called insanity, evidence of mental disease or defect is still admissible to show
a lack of mens rea, thus exempting certain mentally ill individuals from criminal liability.”).
106. See sources cited supra note 101.
107. See State v. Jorrick, 4 P.3d 610, 617 (Kan. 2000) (“Kansas . . . legislatively abolished the
insanity defense.”).
108. See id. (“Kansas is among a minority of states that have done away with the insanity and
diminished capacity defenses.”); see also State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (2003) (“The insanity
defense . . . has been abolished in Kansas . . . .”).
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approach disregards the defendant’s inability to differentiate right from
wrong. Respondent admits as much.109
Furthermore, evidence of mental illness rarely refutes mens rea in
the first place.110 Indeed, Justice Breyer has recognized that refutation
of mens rea “depends not on moral responsibility but on empirical
fact.”111 Because mental illnesses typically impact moral responsibility
rather than the intent to act, evidence of such illnesses usually does very
little to disprove mens rea.112 “[A] man who commits murder because
he feels compelled by demons still possesses the mens rea required for
murder.”113 In other words, the mens rea approach offers mentally ill
defendants about as much protection in trial as an umbrella made out
of tissue paper offers in a thunderstorm. A statutory scheme cannot
qualify as a version of the insanity defense when it rarely protects
mentally ill defendants and is categorically unrelated to mental illness.
Relying on Clark, Respondent points out that the Court has held
that no particular insanity test is deeply rooted, and thus, Respondent
is entitled to deference when implementing criminal insanity policies.114
This argument is also unavailing. True, the Clark Court held that “due
process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity,”
giving states the freedom to choose among a number of historically
utilized insanity tests.115 However, the Clark court did not hold that any
criminal insanity policy would be constitutional and it did not permit
states to ignore defendants’ moral understanding of their actions.116 In
fact, the Court in Clark held that Arizona’s curtailing of its insanity
defense was “constitutionally adequate” in part because Arizona still
allowed defendants to obtain acquittal by proving moral incapacity

109. Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *47 (“Convicting those who . . . do not recognize
their actions are wrong, is not cruel and unusual.”).
110. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *5 (“[M]oral or rational defects almost never negate
even the narrowest criminal states of mind.”).
111. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 791 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Brief of American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association,
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae at 25, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135
(June 7, 2019) (“The clinical experience of mental health professionals, as well as the peerreviewed scientific literature, support the conclusion that severe mental illness can seriously
impair an individual’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.”).
113. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987).
114. Brief for Respondent, supra note 82, at *39.
115. Clark, 548 U.S. at 749.
116. See id. at 754 (Holding that a state’s insanity defense rule was “constitutionally
adequate” in part because it allowed defendants to present evidence of “moral incapacity”).
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resulting from mental illness.117 By eliminating the foundational
principle that defendants must know right from wrong to be criminally
liable, Respondent goes beyond what Clark and the Fourteenth
Amendment allow.
B. The Eighth Amendment does not apply to the statute at issue in this
case.
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment
has no bearing on the law at issue because Kansas’s statute does not
address punishment. The Eighth Amendment applies to “modes or acts
of punishment . . . . “118 Justice Scalia noted that, at a minimum, for a
statute to be subject to the Eighth Amendment’s restrictions, it must
impose a “particular mode[] of punishment.”119 Kansas’s statute does
not. It solely addresses the kinds of arguments a defendant can make
at trial. It does not criminalize any activity, and it does not prescribe a
sentence. The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishments,
not trial mechanics, criminal proceedings, or other functions of the
criminal justice system. To the extent that these other functions treat
defendants in a cruel and unusual way, the Due Process Clause is the
proper constitutional shield. As explained in Section I, this is exactly
the case here.
Relying on Robinson v. California, Petitioner argues that a mere
felony conviction, regardless of subsequent sentencing, constitutes
punishment subject to the Eighth Amendment.120 Thus, a statute that
establishes liability may still qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.121
This is true. However, this reasoning does not make the Eighth
Amendment any more applicable to the statute at issue here. Kansas’s
statute does not establish liability. It does not criminalize any act.
Furthermore, Petitioner’s reliance on Robinson is misplaced. The
Robinson Court struck down a state statute that made it illegal for
someone to be addicted to narcotics and mandated a ninety-day prison

117. Id.
118. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (emphasis added).
119. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[T]he
Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment intended its Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause as a check on the ability of the Legislature to authorize particular modes of punishment—
i.e., cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.”).
120. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at *29 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962)).
121. See id.
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sentence.122 In that case, the Court held that criminalizing someone’s
status as an addict constituted cruel and unusual punishment.123 That
decision is not analogous to this case. Kansas’s statute does not make it
a crime to be mentally ill. It merely governs what arguments a
defendant can make at trial when they are accused of violating a
different statute entirely. There is a difference between statutes that
punish behavior and statutes that set the rules for trial. The former falls
under the Eighth Amendment’s restrictions; the latter does not. A
statue cannot constitute cruel and unusual punishment when it does
not punish.
Mr. Kahler may very well be correct that his death sentence serves
no penological purpose. He may be correct that sending mentally ill
defendants to prison in general serves no penological purpose. But Mr.
Kahler was not convicted because he has a mental illness. He was
convicted because he committed a murder. Mr. Kalher’s arguments
may support the Eighth Amendment reversal of his individual
sentence, which is not at issue here, but not of an entire statute that
bears little relationship to punishment.
CONCLUSION
In Kahler v. Kansas, the Court has the opportunity to clarify a clear
Due Process Clause standard for the insanity defense. The Court should
use this opportunity to formally recognize a bedrock criminal law
principle that has been entrenched in the American legal tradition for
generations: the Constitution prohibits states from assigning criminal
liability to people whose mental illness prevents them from
understanding the wrongfulness of their actions. This is the
constitutional due process foundation upon which the insanity defense
should rest. Such a decision would do right by defendants, the criminal
justice system, and the Constitution itself.

122. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661–667.
123. Id. at 666–667.

